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 <front>
  <journal-meta>
   <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law</journal-id>
   <journal-title-group>
    <journal-title xml:lang="en">Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law</journal-title>
    <trans-title-group xml:lang="ru">
     <trans-title>Журнал зарубежного законодательства и сравнительного правоведения</trans-title>
    </trans-title-group>
   </journal-title-group>
   <issn publication-format="print">1991-3222</issn>
   <issn publication-format="online">2587-9995</issn>
  </journal-meta>
  <article-meta>
   <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">13010</article-id>
   <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.12737/21261</article-id>
   <article-categories>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="ru">
     <subject>МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ПРАВО, ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЕ ПРАВО</subject>
    </subj-group>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="en">
     <subject>INTERNATIONAL LAW, EUROPEAN LAW</subject>
    </subj-group>
    <subj-group>
     <subject>МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ПРАВО, ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЕ ПРАВО</subject>
    </subj-group>
   </article-categories>
   <title-group>
    <article-title xml:lang="en">FEDERAL STATE CLAUSE, TERRITORIAL UNITS CLAUSE AND FEDERAL RESERVATION — THE WAYS TO LIMIT INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS</article-title>
    <trans-title-group xml:lang="ru">
     <trans-title>Клаузула о федеративном государстве, клаузула о территориальных единицах и федеративная оговорка – способы ограничения международных договорных обязательств</trans-title>
    </trans-title-group>
   </title-group>
   <contrib-group content-type="authors">
    <contrib contrib-type="author">
     <name-alternatives>
      <name xml:lang="ru">
       <surname>Осминин</surname>
       <given-names>Борис Иванович</given-names>
      </name>
      <name xml:lang="en">
       <surname>Osminin</surname>
       <given-names>Boris Иванович</given-names>
      </name>
     </name-alternatives>
    </contrib>
   </contrib-group>
   <pub-date publication-format="print" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2016-08-24T00:00:00+03:00">
    <day>24</day>
    <month>08</month>
    <year>2016</year>
   </pub-date>
   <pub-date publication-format="electronic" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2016-08-24T00:00:00+03:00">
    <day>24</day>
    <month>08</month>
    <year>2016</year>
   </pub-date>
   <volume>2</volume>
   <issue>4</issue>
   <self-uri xlink:href="http://jzsp.ru/articles/article-2461.pdf">http://jzsp.ru/articles/article-2461.pdf</self-uri>
   <abstract xml:lang="ru">
    <p>Федеративные государства могут испытывать определенные трудности в реализации международных договоров по вопросам, которые конституциями отнесены к ведению их субъектов. В таких случаях федеративное государство не может стать участником договора без уступок со стороны субъектов федерации и других участников договора. Принято выделять способы, посредством которых можно облегчить решение этих проблем: клаузула о федеративном государстве, клаузула о территориальных единицах и федеративная оговорка. В некоторые договоры может включаться клаузула о федеративном государстве, которая ограничивает его обязательства вопросами, подпадающими под определенную конституцией юрисдикцию федерального правительства. Другим способом является включение клаузулы о территориальных единицах, предусматривающей, что договор может распространяться не на все, а лишь на определенные территориальные единицы. Некоторые федеративные государства формулируют оговорки, направленные на ограничение своих обязательств только сферой законодательной юрисдикции федеральных органов. Другие государства иногда возражают против таких оговорок. В качестве альтернативы федеративные государства могут сделать заявления, разъясняющие, как федеративное устройство будет влиять на имплементацию ими договора. Унитарные государства стремятся противостоять включению клаузулы о федеративном государстве и клаузулы о территориальных единицах, поскольку они создают неравенство прав и обязательств для федеративных и унитарных государств — участников договора. Хотя включение таких клаузул не приветствуется унитарными государствами, это позволяет федеративным государствам становиться участниками международных договоров. Такие клаузулы являются результатом компромисса между унитарными и федеративными государствами. Внутригосударственное право не может служить в качестве оправдания для невыполнения международных договорных обязательств. В соответствии с международным правом, если субъекты федерации не выполняют договор, заключенный федеративным государством, то ответственность за нарушение несет федеральное правительство.</p>
   </abstract>
   <trans-abstract xml:lang="en">
    <p>Federal states may encounter difficulties in applying international treaties on matters constitutionally committed to their constituent units. In such cases a federal state may not be able to join the treaty without some accommodation either by its constituent units or other parties to the treaty. There are certain methods by which these problems can be reduced: federal state clauses, territorial units clauses, and federalism reservations. Some treaties may include a federal state clause to the effect that limits the scope of treaty’s obligations to those that federal state’s government has constitutional authority to assume. Another solution is to include a territorial units clause where the treaty may apply to some of a state’s constituent units but not others. Several federal states have made reservations to limit their obligations to those areas of legislative jurisdiction that the federal government has assumed. On occasion, other states have objected to such reservations. Alternatively, a federal state may issue a federal declaration to explain how federalism affects its implementation of the treaty. Unitary states tend to resist the federal state clause and the territorial units clause because they create an imbalance between rights and obligations of the contracting federal and unitary states. Although such clauses are not popular with unitary states, they do make it that much easier for federations to become parties. Such clauses are a compromise between the interest of unitary and federal states. Domestic law provides no excuse for a failure to fully implement international treaty obligations. In international law, if the constituent units fail to comply, it is the federal government that is liable for the failure to properly implement the treaty.</p>
   </trans-abstract>
   <kwd-group xml:lang="ru">
    <kwd>клаузула о федеративном государстве</kwd>
    <kwd>клаузула о территориальных единицах</kwd>
    <kwd>федеративная оговорка</kwd>
    <kwd>федеративное понимание</kwd>
    <kwd>федеративное заявление</kwd>
    <kwd>федеративное государство</kwd>
    <kwd>федеральное правительство</kwd>
    <kwd>субъекты федерации</kwd>
    <kwd>унитарное государство</kwd>
    <kwd>международные договорные обязательства.</kwd>
   </kwd-group>
   <kwd-group xml:lang="en">
    <kwd>federal state clause</kwd>
    <kwd>territorial units clause</kwd>
    <kwd>federalism reservation</kwd>
    <kwd>federalism understanding</kwd>
    <kwd>federal declaration</kwd>
    <kwd>federal state</kwd>
    <kwd>federal government</kwd>
    <kwd>constituent units</kwd>
    <kwd>unitary state</kwd>
    <kwd>international treaty obligations.</kwd>
   </kwd-group>
  </article-meta>
 </front>
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  <p></p>
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