

# Constructing the Soviet Man's Image in Modern Liberal Sociology Discourse (Levada-Centre Texts Cases)

## Конструирование образа советского человека в дискурсе современной либеральной социологии (кейс текстов «Левада-Центра»)

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### **Аннотация**

В статье исследуются практики дискурсивного конструирования образа советского (в том числе и советского человека) в дискурсе современной российской социологии. В качестве конкретного эмпирического кейса авторами избираются тексты «Левада-Центра» (далее – ЛЦ), которые анализируются с применением критического дискурс-анализа в вариациях Н. Фэркло. Подход основан на исследовании мифологем и дискурсов советского на базе разработок Р. Барта и П. Бурдьё. Дискурс советского (человека) анализируется как дискурс имплицитно либеральной социологии, которая, отрицая эксплицитную идеологичность, при этом воспроизводит вненаучные (в частности, мифологические, идеологические, мировоззренческие) структуры. Подчеркивается, что такая имплицитная идеологическая и мировоззренческая ангажированность, не определяемая обязательно как интенциональная ориентация, оказывает существенное влияние как на программирование исследований, так и на объективность их результатов, так и на дискурсивные практики их описания и интерпретации. Приводятся и анализируются типичные практики и структуры дискурсивизации образа советского (человека) в текстах ЛЦ. Отдельный акцент сделан на политических коннотациях предлагаемых авторами текстов ЛЦ номинаций, дискурсов и означиваний. Формулируется вывод об ограничениях объективности политической и

дискурсивной репрезентации образа советского (человека) в современной (в частности, либеральной) социологии на примере текстов ЛЦ.

**Ключевые слова:** советский человек, «Левада-Центр», дискурс-анализ, конструирование, репрезентация, образ, дискурс, либеральная социология.

### **Abstract**

The article examines the practice of discursive construction of the image of the Soviet (including the Soviet person) in the discourse of modern Russian sociology. As a specific empirical case, the authors choose the texts of the Levada Center (hereinafter - LC), which are analyzed using critical discourse analysis in N. Fairclough's variations, based on the study of mythologemes and discourse of the Soviet based on the developments of R. Barthes and P. Bourdieu. The discourse of the Soviet (man) is analyzed as a discourse of implicitly liberal sociology, which, while denying explicit ideology, reproduces non-scientific (in particular, mythological, ideological, worldview) structures. It is emphasized that such an implicit ideological and worldview bias, not necessarily defined as an intentional orientation, has a significant impact on both the programming of research and the objectivity of their results, and the discursive practices of their description and interpretation. Typical practices and structures of the discoursivization of the image of the Soviet (man) in the texts of the LC are presented and analyzed. A special emphasis is made on the political connotations of the nominations, discourses and denotations proposed by the authors of the LC texts. A conclusion is formulated about the limitations of the objectivity of the political and discursive representation of the image of the Soviet (person) in modern (in particular, liberal) sociology on the example of LC texts.

**Keywords:** Soviet man, Levada Center, discourse analysis, construction, representation, image, discourse, liberal sociology.

### **(Post) Soviet: from ignorance to problematization**

The disintegration (totality) of the Soviet, which began long before it became politically, socio-structurally and ideologically obvious and formalized, led not only to the ideological «vacuum» that researchers of the post-Soviet space have so often pointed out in the past 30 years. Indeed, this «vacuum» itself turned out to be very illusory: the officially proclaimed rejection of ideology in the Constitution of the Russian Federation [6] by its very structure turned out to be a liberal act - precisely from the positions that the priorities and values implicit in the same document represent and embody the liberal mythologicalum and ideologicalum.

However, it is much more important that, in addition to the ideological «vacuum» [10], this disintegration led to multiple and active attempts to (re) interpret the Soviet as (continuation) of the Russian, anti-Russian, counter-Russian, alternative Russian, and so on, on the one hand, as imperial and (or) anti-imperial, on the other, as emancipatory and enslaving, on the third, as regressive and progressive, on the fourth, as modernizing [13, 15, 16], de-modernizing, traditionalist, etc. At this juncture, of course, the leading scholars immediately showed up – at least in terms of quantitative parameters (publications, citations, media activity, etc.). Even without mentioning of purely historiographic works and research, as well as political economic, geopolitical, military-historical and other works that are tangential to the problems of the Soviet, it is just in sociology that it is worth recalling L. Gudkov [5], V. Petrov [17], V. Maslovsky [13, 14, 15], T. Shanin [21], D. Dimke [7], A. Filippov [18, 19], G. Batygin [2], E. Koscheev [11], L. Kozlova [9], D. Maslov [12]. In Western sociology, among one way or another affecting the anthropological, philosophical, worldview aspects of the Soviet project, it is worth recalling the works of such researchers as M. Shifman [42], P. Gregory [31], P. Tsatsouline [49], Sh. Fitzpatrick [28], S. Finkel [27], R. Schlesinger [40], G. Littlejohn [36], K. Menhert [38], D. Bertaux [23], A. Sella [41], B. Simon [44], T. Starks [47], M. Geller [30], L. Siegelbaum [43], V. Laqueur [33], I. Berlin [22], etc. In the last half decade alone, attempts to comprehend this complex topic have been presented by such authors as S. Link [35], V. Smolkin [46], D. Smith [45], D. Rainbow [39], J. McKinney [37], M. Edele [25], D. Erdozain [26], M. Lewin [34], M. Galmarini-Kabala [29] and others.

All these attempts have addressed primarily the ontology of the Soviet — or, more precisely, the ontology of what has been interpreted as Soviet. It does not matter whether it was about a Soviet person, a Soviet ideological project, Soviet values, Soviet everyday practices - the ontological aspect of the problem turned out to be a priority. Thus far, a significant role was played by what we, relying on the metaphor of Alain Badiou, can call «politics of truth» and «politics of truthfulness». The status «to be the owner of the truth» and «to have a monopoly of speaking the truth» is too tempting and fascinating for the producers of discourse to carry out at least some deep reflection of their own position, while the post-communist latent-liberal situation of total domination of illusory non-ideology combined with the hegemony of anti-Soviet discourses and symbolisms ( given the state support for such in the overwhelming majority of post-socialist countries) creates all the prerequisites for the multiplication of critical (often defamatory) in relation to the Soviet (past, project, person, ideological discourse, value set, etc.).

Over the past thirty years, thus, a fairly large-scale and voluminous array of texts about the Soviet, in relation to the Soviet and with regard to the Soviet, has accumulated. By itself, this array of texts is a practically unexplored object, however, its volume, variety (from openly apologetic to extremely negative and critical), and its *polygenre* (including monographs, scholarly articles, publicist articles, memoirs, works of art, etc.) is unlikely to ever let something like an exhaustive project for its research to be designed. Whereas after more than a quarter of a century after the destruction of the USSR, these topics are becoming more and more actual. That is why, from our point of view, although more particular but specific sociological research projects are increasingly relevant. Thus far, the most illuminating, as it seems to us, will be the analysis of long-term research projects that have a certain conceptual, epistemological and methodological integrity, as well as internal heredity in relation to themselves. One of these projects is the Levada Center project, which refers to the scholarly works of Yu.A. Levada about the Soviet man [5, 6].

That is why the **purpose of** our research will be to analyze the discourse strategies of the Levada Center (hereinafter - LC) in relation to its object («Soviet man») from the point of view of their objectivity, mythicity (according to R. Barthes) and ideology.

The theoretical basis of our research will be P. Bourdieu's reflexive sociology of science, Barthes's concept of myth in semiotic systems, as well as critical discourse analysis (CDA) in the explications of E. Laclau and C. Mouffe.

The empirical basis of this article is the discourse of the Soviet and post-Soviet, represented in the monograph by L. Gudkov, B. Dubin and N. Zorka «Post-Soviet man and civil society» [6]. This monograph, while not being voluminous, is, as it will be further revealed, eloquently representative from the point of view of the implicit and latent way of describing the Soviet and the post-Soviet by these researchers.

### **Discourses and Practices: Towards the Methodology**

We proceed from the famous maxim of Pierre Bourdieu that:

«At each moment of time there is a hierarchy of research objects and a hierarchy of research subjects, these hierarchies greatly contribute to the distribution of objects between the subjects.... More often than not, such calls for order are not needed, since it is enough to allow internal censorship to operate, which is nothing more than internalized social and educational censorship (“I am not a theoretician,” “I cannot write”). Thus, there is nothing less socially neutral than the relationship between subject and object» [3, p. 9].

Such a critical view of the social foundations of seemingly strictly and unconditionally epistemological and methodological acts is useful to us not just because it allows us to abandon the one-dimensional, primitive and frankly apologetic model of "science in an ivory tower" (R. Merton) in favor of the objectification of scientific activity as socially rooted, but also because it enables us to integrate hypotheses about extra-scientific fragments of knowledge and practices into the study of science - for example, mythical, religious, everyday, «background» (according to M. Polanyi), practical, doxic (according to P. Bourdieu), etc.

Here, the category of myth is especially important for us, which, as we indicated above, we plan to investigate using Barthes's methodology. Let us recall that R. Barthes states:

«The signifier of myth is two-faced: it is both a meaning and a form, filled and at the same time empty. As a meaning, a signifier presupposes the possibility of some kind of reading, it can be seen, it has a sensory reality (as opposed to a linguistic signifier, which has a purely psychic nature); the meaning of myth is meaningful... As an integral set of linguistic signs, the meaning of a myth has its own significance, it is a part of some event..., in the sense, there is already a ready-made meaning that could have turned out to be self-sufficient if the myth had not taken possession of it and turned it into a hollow parasitic form. The meaning itself is ALREADY something complete, it presupposes the presence of some knowledge, past, memory, comparison of facts, ideas, decisions» [1].

This two-facedness of the signifying myth (that is, being as both meaning and form) suggests that a scientific expression in a scientific text can be simultaneously conceptually «readable», having plausible definitions and conceptualizations, but at the same time it has «its own significance» for those who apply to the discourses from this text - and this «self-significance» definitely goes beyond the boundaries of the proper semantic and operational definition.

It is on this ground, as R. Barth writes, the parasitic nature of myth in language is based, which turns language into a victim of myth:

Ordinary language can easily fall prey to myth for another reason. The fact is that the linguistic meaning is rarely complete from the very beginning, not amenable to deformation. This is due to the abstract nature of the linguistic concept; so, the concept of TREE is rather vague, it can come in many different contexts. Of course, the language has a whole set of means of concretization (THIS is a tree, a tree, WHICH, etc.). But nevertheless, a kind of halo of other virtual senses always remains around the final meaning, the meaning is almost always subject to one interpretation or another. We can say that the language offers the myth an openwork meaning. The myth is able to easily penetrate into it and grow there, meaning is appropriated through colonization [1].

This «parasitism» of myth in the language presupposes the «smuggling» penetration of additional meanings and connotations along with the «obvious» and «operationalized» meaning.

That is why, at the methodological-procedural level, we turn to critical discourse analysis, no matter how differently this methodological trend is understood in the analysis of discourses (see, for example, the famous works of Teacher and Wodak, Jorgensen and Philips, as well as [24, 50, 48]). The fact is that thanks to its synthesis of criticism of the ideology of L. Althusser, Frankfurt School and Gramscians, the KDA, firstly, raises the question of the reflexivity and historicity of any discursive practice (which he takes from Frankfurt School), including the metadiscursive (that is, discourse about discourse) practice, and secondly, it appeals to the *social*, and not linguistic, rootedness of any linguistic practice and any meaning, indicating that the structures of linguistics and society are closely related.

The key principles of KDA that we formulate in this article can be summarized as follows:

- discourse is a *social action*, not an abstract operation with signs - and as such, discourse is subject to social determinations;
- the language is ideological, its practice is doubly ideological (both because of the structures of the language and because of the structures of practice);
- discourse is historical and contextual, which forces us to pay special attention to allusions, intertextuality, hints, etc.;
- discourse is socially *produced*, that is, it is not a product of ideally carried out knowledge operations, but that of social relations;
- power, discourse and language are directly related.

Discourse itself, according to N. Fairclough, we can understand as «the use of language», as a social practice, as a text, and consequently, as a sign objectification of discourse in a discursive event. The text, combined with social activity, forms the genres and orders of discourse. Hence, giving N. Fairclough, the connection between language and the order of the social is twofold: the first constitutes the second, but it itself turns out to be socially determined [24] - and that is why the text inevitably *represents the* experience of the language operator and the world in which the language operator practices.

The key procedural aspects of the KDA that we will be implementing are:

- first, the constant appeal to interdiscursiveness (that is, combinations of discourses and genres in the text) and hegemony (that is, attention to the problems of power and domination);  
- second, the isolation of discursive events as direct units of selection - and in them, respectively, the isolation of the units of analysis;

- these units, third, constitute the three levels of its existence found in each discursive event:

A) textual level (analysis of the content and organization of the text / that is, in N. Fairclough's terminology, textures);

B) discursive-practical level - that is, when a discursive event is analyzed as a practice of discourse, for which it is necessary to single out the so-called *key terms*. The ultimate goal of analysis at this level is to describe the relationship between social practice and text;

C) the socio-practical level - that is, the discursive event is analyzed as a social practice, for which the researcher turns to the study of different levels of social organization: the situation, institutions, groups, contexts, ideologies, power, hegemony, etc.

That is why we do not intend to single out a large number of discursive events, however, each of them should be analyzed as deeply as possible from the point of view of isolating and describing the qualities according to the above criteria. Of course, for this, discursive events must be carefully selected as relevantly representative of discourse, which remains the weak point of such a methodological approach - however, as in any sociological study, representativeness and validity remain the final questions facing the sociologist. Nevertheless, when it comes to a fairly compact text (as in our empirical case), being an actual self-summary on the part of the producers of the discourse of their own discursive practice for many years, this potential drawback is weakened.

### **Soviet «near» and «at a distance», juxtaposed and opposed**

The most pronounced axis of comprehension (interpretation, reading) of Soviet in general and Soviet man specifically in the discourse that is being analyzed, is the juxtaposing of «Soviet man» to «man of the Western type». This comparison is carried out in a purely evaluative manner, without a complex philosophical and concrete historical understanding of the fact that the generalized type of «Western man» is nothing more than a conscious simplification of the diversity of value and behavioral characteristics of people presented as a citizen of the collective West. This not only does not correspond to the conclusions of numerous studies carried out by Western social scientists, but also contradicts the basic thesis of the increasing complexity of social systems. In addition, the issue of the Soviet as one of the logical and constitutive outcomes of the development of Western-style modernity is left aside of any study, although such a connection has long been postulated as fully proven (see, for example, [8, p. 186]).

A good illustration of this juxtaposing would be contrasting of “free” and “state-independent” «Western man» to the paternalistic, «slave» consciousness of the «Soviet man», which again is carried out purely mechanistically, abstractly, outside of historical and sociocultural specifics<sup>1</sup>.

Stigmatization<sup>2</sup> of «the Soviet» is carried out not only by reduction of the «mirror reflection» of Western man, but also by reducing a wide variety of forms of interaction between Soviet people and social institutions and a wide variety of historically specific forms of the Soviet system. In this transformed form, the state stands out as the only institution responsible for the functions of social control and social incentives, other social institutions are completely ignored (both, those «complimentary» to the logic of the authors - for example, party, as well as non-complimentary to it).

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<sup>1</sup> Hereinafter, quotations from the work «Post-Soviet man and civil society» (далее приводятся цитаты из книги «Постсоветский человек и гражданское общество»): «Правильный» советский человек не мог представить себе ничего, что находилось бы вне государства... Для него (советского человека) негосударственные медицина, образование, наука, литература, экономика, производство — или просто невозможные вещи, или, как это стало уже в постсоветские времена, нелегитимные, дефектные институции. Он целиком принадлежит государству, это государственно зависимый человек, привычно ориентированный на те формы вознаграждения и социального контроля, которые исходят только от государства...» [6, с. 6].

<sup>2</sup> Which can be understood, among other things, not only in Hoffmann's way, but also with the use of those conceptualizations that are offered by modern researchers [4].

Such discursivization of the Soviet person in his relationship with the state is paradoxically challenged by postulated «dishonesty» of the state, its tendency to "deceive", which is juxtaposed to the legal helplessness of a little man, against which the authors unfold an apocalyptic picture of the universalization of dishonesty<sup>3</sup> - that is, such a situation in which neither the Soviet person nor the Soviet state differ with respect to the observance of obligations. Even setting aside the question of whether the authors are familiar with numerous scientific works that demonstrate that such behavior is the standard response of people to any actions of the authorities (corporate, family, etc.), perceived by individuals as unfair, we note that the most important task of any sociological analysis, that is understanding how society can function at all, is therefore turned by the authors into something completely absurd. Characteristic is the synonymic range that the authors give, thereby discursively producing an additional syntactic and semantic emphasis on the ontological deviance and falsity of their object.

In turn, such a view contradicts the position of the omnipotence of the state in the minds of the «Soviet man», which highlights the weakness and helplessness of an individual<sup>4</sup>. Even without referring to Scott's «strength of the weak» and to the «tactics» of M. de Certeau, we note that the decontextualization and dehistorisation of the view allows the producers of discourse to ignore the well-known historical fact that «statist» sentiments were inherent in the population of the territories that became part of the USSR for a long time before the emergence of the Soviet Union. This preterition says as much about the authors' dox as their own words. A number of used semantic categories (like «deprived of the right to vote» and «power and higher authorities» do not have «full legal capacity and symbolic significance»<sup>5</sup>) simply remain unclear, but they certainly fulfill their function of symbolic-semantic stigmatization and objectification. As well as fulfilling the function of absolutizing the juxtaposing of «progressive Western» and «regressive Soviet».

Another aspect of this contrasting is depriving of the Soviet person of the ontology of a peaceful, open, culturally ready for communication with the Other, friendly and empathic subject<sup>6</sup>. Here the mythology of the westernized doxa unfolds in its entirety: starting with the dichotomy of «mechanical and organic solidarity», which was already implied by Durkheim, where, the first is a sign of a backward and primitive society, while the second is that of progressive and advanced one, and ending with the implicit legitimization of the break of any communication with such a subject<sup>7</sup>. It is curious to observe the resemblance of these discursive techniques with the techniques of dehumanization, which were historically used in many historical situations, and which, in a filmed, euphemized form, are introduced into academic discourse.

It is also discursively important to construct a Soviet person as an arbitrary subject: not forced to turn to self-restraint, not surrounded by enemies<sup>8</sup> objectively, not placed in a situation of inevitable forced mobilization, but voluntarily turning to such «uncivilized» and «closed» ontologies. And the construction of the Soviet man as absolutized in these «freely chosen» ontologies (since the same self-restraint was seen as a necessity by those generations of Soviet people who had to live during

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<sup>3</sup> «Советский человек «знает, что реальное государство его обязательно обманет, не даст что-то даже из того, что ему «положено по закону», будет всячески стараться выжать из него все, что можно, оставив ему минимальный объем средств для выживания. Поэтому он считает себя вправе уклоняться от того, что от него требует власть (халтурит, привороживает, избегает разного рода повинностей)» [6, с. 6].

<sup>4</sup> «Такого рода асимметрия отношений государства и человека (подданного) приводит к представлению, что полнотой дееспособности и символической значимостью обладает только власть или вышестоящее начальство, тогда как сам человек лишен права голоса, способов выражения своих интересов» [6, с. 6].

<sup>5</sup> Isn't this essentially a description of «failed state»? And does this correspond to the doxy picture of the totalitarian omnipotent Leviathan, who absorbed and immobilized a helpless man?

<sup>6</sup> Описывая его как человека «мобилизованного, милитаризованного и закрытого репрессивного общества, интеграция которого обеспечивается такими факторами, как внешние и внутренние враги, а значит — признание им (хотя бы отчасти) оправданности требований о лояльности власти, государственного контроля, привычка к самоограничению (принудительный аскетизм потребительских запросов и жизненных планов)» [6, с. 6].

<sup>7</sup> Indeed, how is communication possible with such a subject, which is initially prepared and oriented towards rupture, which is supported institutionally and politically?

<sup>8</sup> Without referring to the discussion about how really hostile the environment of the Soviet state was, the discursive position of the producers of discourse we are studying is important here, and not historical disputes.

the wars. The generations of Soviet people who socialized in peacetime were not characterized by a greater desire to self-restraint than Westerners) - and this historical complexity is also ignored by the producers of discourse. And, finally, we observe the description of a fundamentally irrelevant object (Soviet society) using fundamentally irrelevant instruments (categories of the capitalist economy like «consumption», «asceticism», «life plans»). Behind such a description there is an imperious discursive rejection of any other ontology, except for the ontology of a neoliberal society of total commodification - and such a doxical instrument of objectification is very indicative, because it characterizes the producer of discourse as fundamentally closed in his interpretations and using these interpretations in power-political, rather than analytical and conceptual purposes.

We have been observing similar characteristics for the description of the political ontology of the Soviet man. Confronting him again with a certain generalized concept of «European mass man», the producers of the discourse apply the rhetoric of «equalization», «decline» in the description of Soviet egalitarianism, rather outdated by the time they began to produce this discourse<sup>9</sup>. Even ignoring the conceptual point that egalitarianism is fundamentally anti-elite, we should note that the discursive strategy of opposing the Soviet to the Western here pushes the authors (perhaps even contrary to their own scientific logic) to juxtapose even what is fundamentally non-juxtaposable - precisely for the purpose of preserving, producing and reproduction of the distance, in order to prevent the «Soviet man» from approaching the «Western man» - and thereby from rehumanizing. With this purpose, Western man is characterized - albeit implicitly, through juxtaposing - as mass character with its inherent complexity and differentiation<sup>10</sup>. The authors identify differentiation of form and differentiation of content: polemically it could be noted that with all the diversity of life forms of «Western man», the content of this life is reduced to the desire for material wealth and financial well-being, which could be meaningfully contrasted in polemics with the growing complexity of Soviet people's life, who were opposing various reductions external to the life world. But this lack of distinctiveness between the form and the content for discursive purposes is in itself so characteristic that we do not consider it necessary to unfold the arguments presented.

We argue that the discursive construction of the «Soviet as regressive» (intuitively correctly identified by the producers of discourse as «simple» or «primitive», but instrumentally extremely controversially defined by them) forces them to use such key terms as «primitiveness», «the absence of intermediaries between the state and individual»<sup>11</sup>, «simplified», «uncontested», etc.<sup>12</sup>. The «Soviet man» is represented and constructed as passive («accustomed» and «forced», «to follow» and «take into account» - the multiply amplified semantic echo of the text emphasizes these key terms), inverted and reduced to the most animal models of behavior («minimization of requests and value criteria (?!), «passive daydreaming», «somehow», etc.<sup>13</sup>). It is easy for such a subject to be denied, in fact, subjectivity (to which a whole layer in post-Soviet sociology, indeed, is devoted), freedom and activity, dynamism and openness, trust and «social capital»<sup>14</sup>. A characteristic set of key terms («difficult to change», «easy to manage», «interests of power», «suspicious», «alien»,

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<sup>9</sup> «В отличие от европейского массового человека, этот тип (советский человек) разделяет эгалитаристские нормы, но понимает их как нормы антиэлитарные, снижающе-уравнительные» [6, с. 6].

<sup>10</sup> Probably, Jose Ortega y Gasset, who cannot be accused of being Soviet in any way, would have been very surprised at such a correlation.

<sup>11</sup> Apparently, the ideals of «direct democracy» at this moment can be forgotten for discursive and power purposes.

<sup>12</sup> «Простота» в самоопределениях — это вовсе не открытость миру и готовность к его принятию, а примитивность социального устройства, отсутствие посредников между государством и человеком. «Человек советский» был вынужден и приучен следовать и принимать в расчет только упрощенные образцы и стратегии существования, но принимать их в качестве безальтернативных («немногое, но для всех») [6, с. 7].

<sup>13</sup> Ориентации на «простоту» представляют собой стратегии выживания, минимизации запросов и ценностных критериев, наряду с пассивной мечтательностью и верой, что в будущем жизнь каким-то образом улучшится [6, с. 7].

<sup>14</sup> «Этот человек трудно изменяем, но им легко управлять (по крайней мере, в тех рамках, которые оказываются достаточными для интересов самосохранения власти). Он подозрителен в отношении всего «иногo» и «сложного» (которое идентифицируется им как чужое и угрожающее), недоверчив (ибо не знает более сложных и высоких форм гратификации), пессимистичен (ибо весь опыт его свидетельствует о том, что государственная власть использует его как ресурс собственного существования, пытаясь по возможности решать свои проблемы за счет населения, всегда ценой снижения его уровня жизни и благополучия) и пассивен» [6, с. 7].

«threatening», «distrustful», «does not know more complicated ones», «pessimistic», «lower living standards», «passive») is not only historically and sociologically extremely problematic, but also highly indicative from the point of view of the strategy of constructing a «Soviet man» as an «antipode» of all conceivable virtues (even those that he probably does not even possess) of a «Western man», - in other words, as dehumanized, different, alien, incorrigible. This liberal discourse is conceptually and ideologically no different from the famous phrase of A. Chubais<sup>15</sup> - especially when you consider that he is naturalized and reified in «psychological traits» (ignoring, of course, the issue of social constructability and variability of those), also described in an alarmist and dehumanizing way («envious», «anxious», «chronically», «A mixture of frustration, aggression and asthenia», «long-term suppression», «paralyzed» - and the contrasting to «planning», «self-discipline», «work for oneself», «achievement motives», «self-organization»)<sup>16</sup>.

Such a psychologization of purely social - and therefore inevitably heterogeneous, multifactorial and variational - variables inevitably affects the description of the mechanics of thinking of the «Soviet man»<sup>17</sup>. They use the key terms of archaism («particularism», inability to rationalize), irrationality (mosaicism, unsystematicity), unreliability (willingness to adapt), cowardice (willingness to reduce the «quality of life») and even mythologizing totalitarianism («doublethink mode»). Note that while, for example, D. Lane, using this Orwellian metaphor, categorically stressed that he used it as a metaphor, which he made it clear to the reader [32], his post-Soviet conceptual allies in the discursive «fight against the Soviet» claim to, obviously, the development of a scientific category, ontologically tied to the Soviet.

### **(Post) Soviet in the double construction of the past and the present: discursive production is functional for retrojection<sup>18</sup>**

The social production of the discourse about the Soviet is also implicit in the production of the discourse about the post-Soviet. For example, when authors deny (post)Soviet macrosocial<sup>19</sup>, the producers of discourse implicitly contrast in the production process Weber's «rationalized», Popper's «open», liberally «free»<sup>20</sup> space of the macrosocial - and the «archaic closed», «totalitarian non-free», «closed» space of the intimate and personal, and this is determined through opinions about a meeting with injustice (in other words, matching social activity and social protest, which also quite clearly highlights the doxa and myths of the producers of this discourse). This is done from the position of the **hegemony of «progressivism»**, that is, the power of «the one who is ahead

<sup>15</sup> «Permission» to die out for thirty million «Soviet people» who «did not fit into the market» is conceptually no different from this - by the way, we note, also quite liberal - description, produced with the use of scientific weapons.

<sup>16</sup> «Советский человек весьма завистлив и хронически тревожен. Любые состояния неопределенности, резкого усложнения ситуации вызывают в нем смесь фрустрации, агрессии и астении, так как длительное подавление извне мотивов достижения, работы для себя, самодисциплинирования, являющегося обязательным условием для планомерной (в этом смысле — институционально поддержанной) деятельности парализовало в нем механизмы самоорганизации» [6, с. 8].

<sup>17</sup> «Подобный режим двоемыслия (мозаичность сознания, партикуляризм, способность соединять кажущиеся несовместимыми нормы и представления) порождает человека, достаточно эластичного, чтобы выносить внешние давление и контроль («русское терпение»), и вместе с тем неспособного к коллективной солидарности или систематической рационализации собственного действия, готового приспособиться к любым переменам ценой снижения запросов и качества жизни (выбор понижающих стратегий жизни)» [6, с. 9].

<sup>18</sup> This author's concept, which has not yet received full development, means the processes of discursive and symbolic production of the past by analogy with design as the production of the future.

<sup>19</sup> «Судя по распределению ответов на вопросы о справедливости/несправедливости отношения к респонденту, область наиболее упорядоченных, согласованных и одобряемых отношений ограничивается исключительно личными и неформальными отношениями в семье и дружеском кругу, чуть в меньшей степени — на работе или в учебном классе. Здесь минимальные доли ответов о том, что с опрошенным обошлись плохо и несправедливо (причем никаких значимых различий в социально-демографическом плане не заметно)» [6, с. 43].

<sup>20</sup> «Заметим, что дискурс «свободы» является критически и категорически значимым для данных производителей, прежде всего в установлении сочленения разных способов и образов гегемонии (см. далее) — например, «гегемонии вестернизации» и «гегемонии свободы»: Свобода и право — два основных понятия, с которыми напрямую связаны история европейского просвещения и становление гражданского общества» [6, с. 80].



in development». Objectification here is carried out at the level of texture, the key of which is the words «limited exclusively» (which lays down a specific perception of this discourse act). Note that this hegemony is constantly (self) reinforced by historical constructs<sup>21</sup>, produced from the standpoint of the unambiguous retrojection of linear history in its almost Hegelian reading of history as an extension of freedom.

Adjacent to it is objectification from the position of «hegemony of rationality»<sup>22</sup>. The strength of this hegemony is such that it even oversteps the «Weberian commandment of objectivity», pushing the author to latent deontologization (that is, transferring discourse to the realm of «must», in juxtaposing of the existing and the necessary - from the position of the author, of course, necessary). It is from the standpoint of such an ontology that the key terms such as «correlation», «formal», «legally formalized», «system» are contrasted to the key terms «unexpressed», «vaguely», «indefinitely», «implied», «looking at», «different» (repeated many times), «paternalism», «guardianship», «lack of freedom», «arbitrariness»<sup>23</sup>. It is with the use of such key terms that the hegemonic contrasting of the imperious and the strong “rational” (in the register of «clear» and «formalized») and the dominant and weak «irrational» (in the register of «unformalized» and «vague») is practiced. This practice gives out the bearers of a specific doxa oriented towards a westernized system of ethics and practice that claims to be monopoly.

These hegemonic discourses unite in the «hegemony of democracy»<sup>24</sup>. They are reinforced with the key terms «confused», «amorphous» and «contradictory», any search for an alternative to global Westernization is branded as «national traditions and specificity» - and, what is significant, this hegemony of democracy is not even destroyed in the dox of producers of discourse by the awareness of specific «undemocraticism» of the «Eltsin» Constitution of 1993<sup>25</sup>. In the production of this discourse, the reinforcing key term «even», which assigns to the same constitution a special

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<sup>21</sup> «Буржуазно-демократическая революция, которая началась в России в начале XX века и была прервана в 1917 году, в наши дни продолжается. И нет сомнения, что после торжества «духа буржуазности» и отказа от традиционных, привычных навыков мышления наступит момент, когда у россиян появится внутренняя потребность в свободе, и они начнут не только понимать, но и отстаивать свои права и свободы» [6, с. 81].

<sup>22</sup> «Понимание справедливости в России предполагает соотнесение не с формальным письменным законом или юридически оформленной системой норм и регулирующих поведение положений и правил, а с невыраженным или выраженным очень смутно и неопределенно материальным (ситуативно и субъектно подразумеваемым) пониманием права, предполагающим оценку поведения, «взирая на лица и обстоятельства», то есть применение разных норм к разным субъектам действия, представление о правах, разных на разных уровнях власти или у носителей разных социальных ролей. Отсюда разная степень жесткости оценки нарушителей закона и готовность смириться с разными последствиями нарушения нормы у разных субъектов действия. Представления о справедливости тесно увязаны и с пониманием степеней собственной свободы действия, а значит и собственной ответственности за его результаты. Выраженный государственный патернализм российского населения, ожидание попечительской политики властей в определенном плане являются производными от сознания границ собственной (а не внешней) свободы (декларируемой или признаваемой свободы других) и невозможности изменить рамки существования, навязанные человеку властью. Это не столько какой-то мистический, генетически предопределенный патернализм, вера во власть, но достаточно рационально понимаемые несвобода и зависимость от власти, от ее произвола, неконвенциональности этого произвола, непредсказуемости его. В сумме три четверти россиян уверены, что человек в России редко или совсем не может добиться через суд пересмотра несправедливого решения того или иного государственного органа» [6, с. 47].

<sup>23</sup> Although, funny, in another place the producers of the same discourse quite apologetically remind the thought of the European enlighteners that «свобода... не является естественным состоянием общества. Чтобы обладать свободой, человек должен соотнести ее с моралью, без которой немыслимы взаимоотношения людей. Поэтому можно и нужно говорить о правах, если люди мыслятся во взаимном отношении друг к другу. Право — ничто вне таких отношений» [6, с. 79]. By itself, the «confusion», «amorphousness» and «non-formalization» of such relations is not comprehended in any way and is not criticized by the producers of (post) Soviet discourse.

<sup>24</sup> «Даже спустя полтора десятка лет после принятия новой Конституции РФ представления россиян о демократии носят спутанный, аморфный и противоречивый характер. Большинство (60%) считает, что в стране нужна демократия, но лишь 20% видят образец в западных странах и США, относительное большинство (45%) считает, что России нужна «совершенно особая, соответствующая национальным традициям и специфике» демократия» [6, с. 49].

<sup>25</sup> «Конституция 1993 года была сделана лично под Б. Ельцина. Для проведения реформ она предоставляла президенту почти царские полномочия, что в дальнейшем, при смене правителя, обернулось и против самой «демократии», и против политики реформ» [6, с. 53].

mission to democratize the consciousness of post-Soviet people, in no way contradicts the recognition of the undemocratic nature of the creation and adoption of the same constitution (which is generally called «legally weak» elsewhere, by the way!)

Another powerful hegemonic toolkit that producers of (post) Soviet discourse like to use is the «discourse of truth». The claim to truth is generally an extremely powerful argument, and naturalization and reification of truth (especially in socio-political issues) is a powerful means of eliminating an opponent or stigmatizing him as an obscurantist, stupid, unskilled or even dangerous to society. The «hegemonic discourse of democracy» synthesized above, due to the problematic nature of the very idea of democracy in a globalized world, needs to be reinforced by certified and institutionally true models of democracy, which are solely and monopolistically recognized as exceptional and absolute<sup>26</sup>. In this case, the argumentation of the truth is carried out in an indirect way - through the description of a group of supporters. Key terms, such as «high-yield», «urban», «educated», «a wide range of information», «travel abroad», «own eyes», «other life» demonstrate social practice, brilliantly analyzed by H. Elias in his «The Established and the Outsiders». In such practice, truth and social status are combined in the mythological logic of kalokagatiya. A sociologist (co) producing such an argument in such a discursive practice and construction inevitably takes a position in social conflicts and confrontations on the side of the apologists of the prevailing order<sup>27</sup> and against its critics.

This argument is discursively reinforced by the latent juxtaposing of the dominant groups («established») to a group of outsiders, whose way of life (most often forced) is interpreted as an argument against their worldview, and their very worldview and values - as «archaic», «not free», «undemocratic», «mechanical», «not knowing freedom and rights», etc.<sup>28</sup> This is reinforced by the «discourse of autonomy», in which the (post) Soviet person is described as **passive** (the key term is «just to manifest»)<sup>29</sup>, **dependent and not free** (key terms – «habitual dependence», «demonstrative mass participation», «administrative mobilization», «least modernized», «state-paternalistic attitudes», «binding»)<sup>30</sup>, **regressive and obscurantist** (key terms – «traditionalism», «discrediting

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<sup>26</sup> «Такое состояние массового сознания неслучайно, поскольку сами представления о демократии возникли из трех основных источников; они связаны с: а) неясными идеями политического переустройства, циркулировавшими во время перестройки (справедливое устройство, возможность критики властей и т.п.) либо б) опытом разочарования, полученным в кризисные времена постсоветского развития («хаос», «демагогия», «безответственность»). Лишь очень небольшая часть опрошенных под «демократией» понимают то, что, собственно, и составляет демократическую систему: в) разделение ветвей власти, система сдержек и противовесов, конкуренция партий за поддержку избирателей, политическая ответственность, партийное правительство, уходящее в отставку в случае выраженного недовольства граждан. Эти 9–12% респондентов представляют самые образованные и высокодоходные группы городского населения, людей, обладающих сравнительно широким кругом информации, а также хотя бы раз выезжавших за границу и собственными глазами видевших другую жизнь» [6, с. 51-52].

<sup>27</sup> What, we note, can be equally powerful as the local order of the state, and the global order of ideological and / or institutional domination.

<sup>28</sup> «Поспешное принятие юридически слабой Конституции, провозглашение «свободы выбора» в условиях распадающегося тоталитарного режима привели к тому, что на поверхность вышли самые массовые, а потому самые консервативные слои и группы, интересы которых не шли дальше физического выживания в условиях острого экономического кризиса, а социально-политические воззрения представляли собой рутинную смесь русского великодержавного национализма и авторитаризма. Такая демократия представляет собой чисто механический перенос заимствуемых моделей политической организации на общество, никогда не знавшее ценностей и норм свободы, права, человеческой автономии, опирающееся на совершенно другие, чем в Европе, культурные, моральные и человеческие основания. Это демократия без необходимых для нее институциональных и культурных форм» [6, с. 53].

<sup>29</sup> «На всех выборах в Думу (1993–2007 годов) избирателю предлагалось лишь манифестировать свое принятие или непринятие власти и ее оппонентов, кандидатов во власть» [6, с. 54].

<sup>30</sup> «Выборы в условиях авторитарного государства, сложившегося в 2000-е годы, и привычной зависимости от него большинства людей сводятся к обеспечению демонстративного массового участия населения\*. В России сегодня это означает административную мобилизацию наименее модернизированных групп (сельского населения, жителей малых и средних городов), характеризующихся самыми сильными государственно-патерналистскими установками, что обеспечивает успех и победу соответствующей партии власти, действующей номенклатуры (вместе с созданными ею вспомогательными и временными образованиями, связывающими протестные настроения)» [6, с. 54-55].

changes», opposing «reforms» and «innovations»<sup>31</sup>, **slavish** (and at the same time - paradoxically – **arrogant** and **narcissistic**) (key terms – «imperial», «militarism», «great power», «exclusivity», «superiority», «isolationism», «terror», «archaic») and **private** (key terms – «protective», «compensatory», «anti-Western»<sup>32</sup>, «bastions» versus «critical work»)<sup>33</sup>. Here the hegemonies are intertwined: the producers of discourse base their production on an authoritarian-authoritative source that has no relations to the traumatic experience of collapse, or to the experience of Soviet civilization, or to the victory in the Second World War<sup>34</sup>.

Another important hegemony is the «hegemony of freedom». It is close to some of the already described methods of hegemony, but it occupies a special place in the building concrete of the architects of the (post) Soviet discourse. (Post) Soviet people and the structures of power they support are represented as not only not free, but also ontologically, existentially incompatible with freedom<sup>35</sup>. This ontological incompatibility is reinforced by the key terms, such as «fear», «block», «suppress» - and the discursive contrasting to «independent», «sources of influence», «public»<sup>36</sup>. A less obvious way of producing such hegemony is to discourse the opponent as «indifferent», «alienated»<sup>37</sup>, «scanty», «not influencing the power», «confused», «passive», «subject to arbitrariness»<sup>38</sup>, as well as «passive», «negative», «paternalistic», which is compared with the key terms describing the opponent as «unworthy of trust», «obsolete», «outdated», «weak» and «outsider» (see above on this occasion)<sup>39</sup>. The characteristics of «distrust» to the «basis of civil society» also adjoin here (let us pay attention to what exactly is opposed in this construction of the (post)Soviet!)<sup>40</sup>.

Here, the connection between retrojection and the production of today's discourse is especially clearly and vividly traced. The doxically established «totalitarianism» of the Soviet is easily and

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<sup>31</sup> «Традиционализм («русская идея», «особый путь» России) после прихода к власти Путина превратился в средство дискредитации самого периода изменений 1991–1998 годов, а значит — самой идеи реформ, возможностей социально-политических инноваций» [6, с. 56].

<sup>32</sup> For comparison: we failed to find at least indirect characteristics of "closeness" (xenophobia, Russophobia, etc.) performed by the same producers of discourse in relation to the Western world.

<sup>33</sup> «Эксплуатируя разные комплексы представлений — имперскую идеологию (царский милитаризм и советскую великодержавность), этноконфессиональную исключительность и превосходство русских над другими народами, победу во Великой Отечественной войне и травматический опыт развала СССР, государственная пропаганда способствовала усилению антизападных настроений, распространению изоляционизма и подъему компенсаторного или защитного русского национализма. Вместе с осторожной реабилитацией Сталина путинская администрация шаг за шагом вела дело к прекращению критической работы над историческим прошлым, вытеснению из массовой памяти всего, что связано с практикой советского террора, представляя КГБ и другие репрессивные институты, а также архаические институты — армию, церковь как последние бастионы национальных ценностей» [6, с. 56].

<sup>34</sup> To understand the density of key terms in the discourse used by manufacturers of mytho-language: the link is as follows «On the conservative legitimizing role of neo-traditionalism in authoritarian regimes replacing the missionary ideology or political religion of totalitarian regimes, see: Linz J.J. Totalitaere und autoritaere Regime / (Hrsg.) von R. Kraemer. - Berlin: Berliner Debattee Verl., 2000». Perhaps this conglomerate of mythopoetics alone would have been sufficient for a broad illustration of the inner constitution of the discourse produced.

<sup>35</sup> Why is the entire discourse of opponents "quoted", as well as its own discourse is given, often far from obvious and not indisputable definition.

<sup>36</sup> «Страх перед «цветными революциями» (массовыми выступлениями против коррумпированных режимов, как это было на Украине, в Грузии, в Киргизии) заставлял руководство России блокировать или подавлять деятельность любых независимых от власти организаций и источников общественного влияния» [6, с. 57].

<sup>37</sup> «Равнодушие подавляющего большинства людей к политике нарастает по мере осознания ими мизерности своих возможностей влиять на власть. ... люди пенсионного возраста, гораздо сильнее ощущающие на себе деградацию системы социального обеспечения, настроены явно негативно к происходящим переменам и с большим вниманием относятся к текущей политике» [6, с. 60].

<sup>38</sup> «Сам вопрос о возможности влияния граждан на власти разного уровня, задаваемый в ходе социологических опросов, вызывает у опрошенных заметную растерянность. ... Такова доминирующая в обществе установка на пассивное признание самого факта произвола власти» [6, с. 63].

<sup>39</sup> «Подобное представление о социальном устройстве российского общества является негативом государственного патернализма. Оно характерно в первую очередь для пожилых, малообеспеченных, относительно слабо образованных граждан, жителей села или малых городов» [6, с. 63].

<sup>40</sup> «Россияне в массе своей с равнодушием относятся к деятельности неполитических организаций, составляющих основу гражданского общества, мало им доверяют и не собираются их поддерживать» [6, с. 64].

unobtrusively transformed into «fictitious participation in common affairs», «alienation», «detachment»<sup>41</sup>. This is especially important when analyzing the selection of vocabulary («key terms»), which in relation to the (post) Soviet is described as «breaking off social ties», «isolation», «atomization», while in relation to the Western - as «liberation», «individualization», «Rejection of paternalism», «activism from below»<sup>42</sup>. Such particularization is described not as the «internal locus of control» mentioned pathetically in modern literature, but as an opposition to the «generalized, social plan of practice» [6, p. 69], destroyed by «fragmentation»<sup>43</sup> society», «the decomposition of the Soviet», «the inability to innovate» (we pay special attention to the choice of the key vocabulary and semantics of both co- and opposition). Such a «rejection of the ontology» of the singular leads to the ultimate «rejection of the ontology» of the universal: «... it is possible to talk about» society «(respectively, social movements, organizations, etc.) here only in the narrowest social segments and with very serious reservations». [6, p. 71]. The universal is represented in discourse as «permeated with mutual distrust and indifference», «negative identity»<sup>44</sup> [6, p. 73]. At the same time, the emerging logical conflict between the two ways of describing the (post) Soviet as atomized and indifferent, on the one hand, and paternalistic, on the other, cannot be resolved at all: the object of discourse is attributed equally unequivocally negative characteristics of both methods of description, no matter how contradictory they may be. [6, p. 73], and these characteristics are enhanced by the description of the (post) Soviet as a purely selfish and appropriating<sup>45</sup>.

This hegemony articulates with the «hegemony of Westernization», when, both at the level of instrumentation and at the level of interpretation, the producers of discourse recognize the forms and methods of solidarity and cooperation characteristic of Western countries (where, in fact, such conceptualizations were generated), but not necessarily being universal (see [6, p. 77], where these include «sports clubs, creative unions, charitable organizations or voluntary public associations»). It is characteristic that this data is presented without comparison with other countries and societies, without any comparison and relativization, with the assertion of the a priori insufficiency of manifestations of this in the (post) Soviet without demonstrating in which countries and in what volumes they are «sufficient», and what level is generally «necessary». Such discursive absolutization makes it possible to represent any research result as a negative characteristic of the object of discursive construction - a simple technique, but, admittedly, effective and spectacular one.

Conclusively, all this closes in on the «hegemony of anti-totalitarianism», where totalitarianism is compared to the «Soviet past», and the Soviet past itself is opposed to «moral solidarity», «civic responsibility», «common relations» (how the totalitarian can be opposed to the «common» - the authors did not find it difficult to explain) and «powerless social relations and organizations»

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<sup>41</sup> «Фикция участия в общих делах в советском тоталитарном «обществе-государстве» и постсоветской России сегодня оборачивается отчуждением, отстраненностью, сознанием невозможности что-то сделать, повлиять на какие-либо вопросы или решение проблем, касающихся жителей уже на уровне ЖЭКа, не говоря о районе или городе, а тем более о политической, экономической и социальной ситуации в стране» [6, с. 64-65].

<sup>42</sup> «При дефиците базовых ресурсов, которые в российском социуме и обществах похожего типа контролируются централизованной властью, установка исключительно на адаптацию (причем адаптацию чаще всего понижающую) ведет к фрагментации общественной жизни. Сокращение и обрыв социальных связей, изоляция, атомизация — принципиальные черты обществ, пытающихся выйти из тоталитарного порядка. Из данных вышеприведенной таблицы видно, что социальный мир, на который человек может рассчитывать, практически кончается за пределами круга родных и близких» [6, с. 66].

<sup>43</sup> To which the producers of discourse, we note, are extremely unskilful and crudely opposing strongly ideologized constructions: «Важно не смешивать (как это нередко делают в текущей публицистике) подобную **фрагментацию, защитную** и опять-таки **реактивную** по своим функциям, с **формированием и укреплением пространств частной жизни**. Последнее требовало бы **отстаивания и поддержания гарантированных прав на автономию частного существования**, не говоря уже о **частной собственности, неприкосновенность** которой, как убеждены россияне, им почти не гарантирована». [6, с. 78] (our italics are everywhere, keys are italicized).

<sup>44</sup> Incidentally, it is highly controversial, to say the least, definable.

<sup>45</sup> «Патерналистские установки и ожидания абсолютного большинства населения предполагают получение помощи, но не ее оказание другим, если только эти другие — не родственники или близкие друзья» [6, с. 78].

(?????)<sup>46</sup>. The properties of the Soviet are reduced by the key terms such as «repressiveness», «ideology», «blocking», «lack of individuality», «unnaturalness» - and, what is most paradoxical, «pure commercialism and cynicism in relation to socially valuable and imperious»<sup>47</sup>. Ignoring the rootedness of the «totalitarian» and «Soviet» in the very genesis of European civilization (and many researchers, meanwhile, quite reasonably point to the deepest connection between the Soviet project and European Modernity), the producers of this discourse are again erecting a lifeless, abstract, paradoxical utopian picture «Freedom as a moral discipline» (with which one could agree outside the discourse they produced), and the history of the value and ideological system of the Western world, referential for them, as the history of «enlightenment», «civil society», «human rights», «disclosure sense of freedom», «morality in the relationship of people» [6, p. 79]. Such historical schematism turns out to be a powerful mythological basis for a rather eclectic and selectively blind construction built by these discursive producers of (post) Soviet.

### **Conclusion. From the negation of the Soviet to...?**

Thus, one of the texts, which we have chosen as representative due to its status of «summarizing» a long stage in the development of post-Soviet sociology, showed us a whole arsenal of powerful and hegemonic techniques, which are abundantly illustrated with specific key terms. Our basic hypothesis, with which we started this study, was fully confirmed.

Certainly, the study of the representation of the Soviet (including man) in post-Soviet (primarily liberal and Westernized) sociology is just starting. Thirty years of the post-Soviet era provides researchers with considerable space for an objective study of the imperious and hegemonic strategies of objectification of the Soviet. For example, we have not touched upon the emotional equipment of the strategies used by the producers of discourse. We also believe that it is important to investigate those basic doxes that underlie their understanding of the Soviet. We argue that the «political ontology of post-Soviet sociology» still awaits its fundamental, conscientious and critical researcher. We utilized only the epistemological technique of critical discourse analysis, and only in one version - that is why our analysis is rather limited in scope and research. However, we are sure that without researching all this, post-Soviet sociology will remain colonized by Westernized (epistemo)logics and will perform the functions of primarily an apologetic service of the social order (and it does not matter whether at the macro-level, that is, the state level, or at the mega-level, that is, the global order). This is what justifies the need for further search within the epistemological field and heuristic that we have proposed.

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<sup>46</sup> «Однако административно-государственная система управления почти полностью вытеснила моральную солидарность и гражданскую ответственность из сферы общих или коллективных социальных отношений, что привело к практически полному отсутствию невластных социальных связей и организаций» [6, с. 78].

<sup>47</sup> «Если в СССР пространство советского языка, пронизанного репрессивной идеологией, блокировало саму возможность оформления и кристаллизации индивидуальной человеческой мысли, естественных нравственных чувств, то сегодня, выражаясь философским языком, можно сказать, что нравственное состояние чувства постсоветского человека отличается от его естественного чувства тем, что это то же самое чувство, но как бы «узнавшее» себя. Не случайно большинство российских респондентов относится к свободе конкретно: у кого деньги и власть — у того и свобода» [6, с. 79].

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